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Globalization has many dimensions, mostly familiar to many such as trade, 
capital, labor, and knowledge. We distinguish between short-term and long-
term capital flows, and between foreign direct investment and short-term 
capital flows. In terms of labor, we are not only interested in the flows of labor 
across countries but also across education markets. But these are only the 
economic dimensions of globalization. There are other dimensions to 
globalization as well, having to do with, for instance, globalization of civil 
society, which has had such an important impact on so many aspects of recent 
events. This discussion focuses on the economic dimensions of globalization 
and tries to relate them in a more positive way to development. 
 
I.  GLOBALIZATION THEN AND NOW 
 
The process of globalization has been going on for a long time. Many of the 
foods that we have all the time, that we take for granted, are a product of global-
ization: a long time ago, coffee spread around the world from Ethiopia. But there 
are several differences between globalization today and globalization in the past. 
A first, obvious difference is its scale. Trade and capital flows are larger as a per-
centage of gross domestic product. A second difference is the speed of 
communications, which makes for a much higher degree of integration and has led 
to the enormous increase in short-term capital flows, which, unlike long-term 
capital flows, were previously very limited. Short-term capital flows have played a 
very important role in the instability that we have seen in the last 25-30 years. 
Historically the whole process of globalization has been marked by asym-
metries. Unfair trade treaties come in various forms, which we saw in the 19th 
century and continue to see today. Unfortunately, that pattern of asymmetric un-
fair trade treaties has continued. 
A third difference with globalization today has to do with the use of force. 
In 1902, just over 100 years ago, when Venezuela could not repay its foreign debt, 
the ships of Europe bombarded Caracas. Today, when countries do not repay their 
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foreign debt, they usually do not get attacked by military means but there are other 
forms of force, economic force, that is used to try to force them to pay. 
There is one final way in which the process of globalization has changed, 
and that is related to the process of democratization. There is much more public 
scrutiny now of what is going on. That is why there is a stronger globalization de-
bate today than 100 years ago. 
 
II.  THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
One of the central ideas that have emerged in the last 10 years has been that 
successful development requires not only closing the gap in resources between the 
developed and less developed countries but also closing the gap in technology, in 
knowledge. Some 50 years ago, at the time the World Bank and other multilateral 
development banks were first set up, it was thought that what distinguished devel-
oped from less developed countries was that less developed countries had less 
capital. Therefore, what was needed in order to make less developed countries into 
more developed countries was to transfer capital. That is why the development in-
stitutions were development banks. But today we recognize that what separates 
developed from less developed countries is also a gap both in knowledge and in 
technology. Therefore, one of the major responsibilities of international institu-
tions, including the multilateral development banks, is to close that gap. 
The region of the world that has been most successful in development has 
been East Asia. Over the last 30-35 years, most of the countries in East Asia have 
seen their per capita incomes increase eightfold. As time goes on, the East Asia 
crisis (1997-1998) looks more or less just like a blip. Countries like Republic of 
Korea (Korea) have returned to their strong and robust economic growth. Looking 
at Korea’s progress over a long span of time, that country has been enormously 
successful not only in promoting economic growth but also reducing poverty. But 
a key to that success was the closing of the technology gap. Forty to fifty years 
ago, not only was per capita income in Korea roughly comparable with or a little 
bit lower than that of, for instance, India, but so was its state of technology. It was 
an agrarian economy. Today, Korea has become a major producer of chips and of 
other electronics. It is engaged in a whole variety of product innovation. 
I was in Korea twice this year and it is always amusing to see how much 
further advanced their cell phone use is than in the United States (US). This was 
something I noticed when I went mountain climbing near the ancient capital. Usu-
ally, in the US, when you go to a remote place, you cannot get any cell phone 
service. But, in Korea, you have service even as you climb up into the mountains. 
Everybody has cell phones. Many of them are also cameras as well, so that the 
climbers can take pictures and send them to friends even as they climb up a moun-
tain. The point is that Korea has made enormous strides in closing the technology 
gap, which in turn has a lot to do with the success that it has had in increasing per 
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capita income. This success in closing the technology gap is a result of explicit ef-
forts on the part of government. It was not just an accident; it did not just happen. 
There was a broad-scale program involving a number of different activities of the 
government that were directed at closing the technology gap.  
 
III.  FREEING UP KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
I want to spend a minute examining the economic theory that lies behind the 
idea that the government needs to be involved in closing the knowledge gap; I 
want to explain why there is a need for government in this important arena. The 
role for government derives from the fact that there are fundamental market fail-
ures in the market for knowledge.  
First, knowledge is a classic example of a public good. Public goods have 
two characteristics: one being “nonrivalrous consumption”, and another being 
“nonexcludability.” The basic idea of nonrivalous consumption related to knowl-
edge is very simple. If you take an object like a chair, for example, only one 
person can sit on a chair at a time. By contrast, my knowing something does not 
detract from your ability to know the same thing. More than one person can know 
the same thing. We can all know, for instance, about how a chair is made or how it 
may be used, even if only one of us can occupy a particular chair.  
Nonexcludability focuses on the difficulties of excluding someone from the 
benefits of a good. Defense is a classic example: if a country’s military expendi-
tures succeed in deterring an attack, all individuals benefit; no one is excluded 
from the benefits, including the skeptic who thought the attack unlikely. If Dupont 
produces a synthetic fibre, rayon, then while it may try to keep the processs by 
which it is produced secret, it cannot keep the knowledge that it is feasible to pro-
duce a synthetic fibre with certain properties; knowing this can have enormous 
impacts on research programs. 
 In fact, the idea that knowledge is different from an ordinary commodity 
was recognized a long time ago. Thomas Jefferson, the third President of the US, 
talked about this in words that were much more poetic than we economists use. He 
did not use words like “nonrivaloust consumption” or “nonexcludability.” He used 
the simple metaphor of a candle. He said knowledge is like a candle. When you 
take that candle and you light another candle, the first candle still continues to 
glow. And yet the second candle catches the fire. The second candle, in turn, can 
light still more candles. The light of a candle can thus be transmitted from one per-
son to the next and not diminish as it goes on. 
There are also large externalities associated with knowledge. (Whenever 
there are externalities, or public goods, market outcomes will not be efficient. 
When there are positive externalities, such as is the case for research, there will be 
“underproduction”) The benefits that come from the discovery of the laser, the 
transistor, or the theory of cancer go well beyond the compensation received by 
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the person who makes the discovery no matter what he may receive. There are 
huge benefits that accrue to others that he does not appropriate himself. 
Markets by themselves thus will naturally lead to too little research, espe-
cially in certain areas, like basic science, where appropriating returns is 
particularly difficult. To improve matters—to increase resources devoted to re-
search—two approaches have been taken. One tries to make the market for ideas 
more like the market for ordinary goods, by making it easier to exclude others 
from the benefits of one’s research. By increasing the ability to appropriate re-
turns, the extent of positive externalities is reduced. This entails creating 
intellectual property rights. But there is a huge cost associated with this strategy: 
while incentives to do research are increased, knowledge is not efficiently used, 
and market and monopoly power is conferred, thus reducing competition in mar-
kets. Balancing the two—the gains in dynamic efficiency with the losses in static 
efficiency—is not easy, and it is not clear that we have achieved the right balance. 
It should be clear, however, that those who say the stronger the intellectual prop-
erty rights the better are almost surely wrong, but such a position ignores the static 
efficiency costs. 
Indeed, it is not even clear that stronger intellectual property rights (beyond 
a point) enhance dynamic efficiency; for the most important input into research is 
other ideas, and intellectual property rights may impede the use of earlier ideas in 
follow-on research. Accordingly, unbalanced intellectual property rights can both 
slow the pace of innovation and reduce economic efficiency today.  
There is an alternative approach—direct government support for research—
and a key policy issue entails the balancing of these two strategies. Unfortunately, 
much of the recent discussion (especially at the World Trade Organization) has 
focused only on enhancing incentives for private production through stronger in-
tellectual property rights.  
I want to take a slight digression here to emphasize that there has been too 
much emphasis on intellectual property rights as a basis for generating knowledge. 
A result of that is that there is a real danger that we will be left with an unbalanced 
intellectual property rights regime. The reason why I say this is that most knowl-
edge is neither generated nor protected by intellectual property rights. To take an 
obvious example, the ideas I am discuss with you today are not protected by intel-
lectual property rights. I think it is important that these ideas, like asymmetric 
information, are not protected by intellectual property rights. When I did my re-
search, I was completely unconcerned with intellectual property rights. In fact, 
while the intent of intellectual property rights is to limit the use of the intellectual 
property to those who are able and willing to pay, I worked very hard to get these 
ideas out there. I travel around the world to tell other people about my ideas and 
hope that they would tell other people about those ideas. The whole idea of intel-
lectual communities, of research within academia research, is that ideas progress 
most rapidly when there is open sharing.  
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Most of our basic insights are not patentable. The theorems that lie behind 
the computer are not subject to patent or copyright. I can go down the list of inno-
vations that have transformed our lives in the last century, but the point that 
should be clear is that much of what we produce in the universitybasic knowl-
edgewhich is the foundation on which all the other innovations rest, is not 
protected by intellectual property rights, and that excessively strong broad intel-
lectual property rights may actually impede economic growth. 
In the discussions leading up to the TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Prop-
erty) Agreement that was part of the Uruguay Round agreement, both the Council 
of Economic Advisers and the Office of Science and Technology Policy raised se-
rious concerns. We both thought the agreement was unbalanced. One reason was 
that the high drug prices would deprive the poor in the least developed countries 
of life-saving drugs. But we also thought it would be bad for the progress of sci-
ence in the US and thus for our growth. 
The US was represented in the trade negotiations by the US Trade Repre-
sentative, and his position was effectively dictated effectively by the drug 
companies in the media. It reflected their special interests. While we were trying 
to say that we needed a more balanced intellectual property regime that reflected 
not just the interests of the drug companies but also the interests of the scientific 
community, of the developing countries, of a broad global interest, and maintained 
a balance between users and producers. Unfortunately, that is not what emerged 
from the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round. In the Doha Round, we are 
currently having difficulty redressing that balance1 even though, initially, there 
was an agreement that something ought to be done about it. The US has been par-
ticularly recalcitrant in doing anything. 
There are other reasons why one should recognize that intellectual property 
rights are really quite different from ordinary property rights, though they have 
been sold by its advocates as if they are just like any other property right. But they 
are fundamentally different. I will just mention two aspects of this here. The first 
is that intellectual property rights, as I noted earlier, cause static inefficiencies. 
What is an intellectual property right? It gives a temporary monopoly power over 
a certain idea. Any monopoly power results in inefficiencies. The reason we do it 
is that we believe there are trade-offs. There may be advantages by accepting the 
loss of static efficiency in order to have enhanced incentives for innovation. We 
recognize that there is a trade-off between short-run and long-run concerns. But 
we have to recognize that intellectual property rights do result in inefficiency in 
the economic system. 
Moreover, much of intellectual property rights involve the enclosure of the 
commons. What do I mean by that? In pre-industrial revolution Scotland, there 
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was common land on which villagers grazed their sheep, but then the rich en-
closed much of it and made it into private property. There was an argument that, 
by doing this, they increased economic efficiency even if it cost enormous hard-
ship on those who were displaced from the land. In a way, much of the intellectual 
property involves the same kind of enclosure: much of what is patented involves 
patenting things that are common knowledge, and placing them within the ambit 
of property rights. That has become particularly apparent with the issue of biopi-
racy, which has been experienced in many developing countries where an 
American or European firm goes into, for example, the high Andes where the me-
dicinal properties of many plants are widely known. American and Europoean 
companies come in and patent them as drugs, so that those in the Andes can no 
longer use them, unless they pay royalties to the American and European firms. 
Yet the people in the Andes already knew about them, including their medicinal 
properties. They had not done the controlled experiments that are needed in order 
to get permission to market them in the US or Eurupe. They certainly have not 
published their knowledge in American or European journals. The knowledge was 
common knowledge, yet the patent attempt was to enclose, to privatize, that com-
mon knowledge and give a particular firm the right to use it. (One of the criteria 
for getting a patent is whether it is novel. And one of the ways you tell if it is 
novel is whether the underlying idea has been previously published. Not surpris-
ingly, it just so happens that people in the Andes, the Indians, do not typically 
publish the results of their herbal medicines, even were their journal is in their na-
tive languages; indeed, it is not clear that they could publish the findings since 
everybody already knows about it in the region, if not in North America.) 
There is clearly something wrong with the system of intellectual property 
rights that was adopted in the Uruguay Round. There needs to be more fundamen-
tal reforms, not just the tickering on the “headline issues,” such as access to AIDs 
drugs. 
But there are other things I want to stress. The first point I want to make is 
that there are alternative ways in which knowledge is produced, i.e., through gov-
ernment support to research and development (R&D) including the products of 
development. 
The second point is that market failures in finance, which arise particularly 
out of asymmetries of information, can adversely affect private expenditures on 
research and development (R&D). It is particularly difficult, or used to be particu-
larly difficult, for firms to finance their R&D because it was hard to collateralize 
these assets. As a result of this, raising finance for many forms of research is diffi-
cult, providing yet another reason why there might be a need for government 
intervention. 
That leads us to the question: Have technology policies worked? In the US, 
this has been a subject of enormous controversy. I call them technology policies 
although they used to be called industrial policies. But in some circles, the term 
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industrial policy has negative overtones, connoting government attempts to shape 
the economy. “Technology policies” is a better term because sometimes technol-
ogy policies affect other sectors than industry, such as agriculture or services. One 
of my colleagues in Stanford who preceded me as Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, Mr. Mike Baskin, used to criticize the very idea of technol-
ogy policies. His view was that he should not try to pick winners. It did not make 
any difference whether the US produced potato chips or computer chips. On the 
contrary, I think it does make a difference whether you produce potato chips or 
computer chips. 
But the issue of whether the government should be involved is somewhat 
different than whether government can “pick winners.” The issue, as I will explain 
below, has to do with whether markets have the rich incentives (and access to re-
sources) to advance technology at the socially efficient pace, or in the socially 
efficient manner, given the public good nature of knowledge, the externalities, and 
the other market failures just discussed. That is the reason why government gets 
involved. It is not because the government is necessarily better in deciding 
whether the product of the future will be potato chips or computer chips. There is, 
in fact, a remarkable record of success in Asia, Brazil, and US in technology poli-
cies. In agriculture, for instance, the US’s technology policy in agriculture began 
in 1863 and the result of explicit government support for research and dissemina-
tion of those ideas was the enormous increase in agricultural productivity in the 
US over the succeeding decades—and it was this that allowed the US to move 
from being an agricultural economy to an industrial economy, because fewer and 
fewer people were needed in order to produce food for the country. It was, in fact, 
the success in agriculture that provided the background for the later industrializa-
tion of the country. 
In recent years, we have talked a great deal about the importance of the new 
economy in the US and the rest of the world. One of the aspects of the new econ-
omy is the improvement in communications, and especially the Internet. The 
Internet has had such a huge impact on the way everyone does business and com-
municates with each other. But we often forget that this whole sector of the 
economy owes its origin effectively to the government. The US government, for 
instance, in the 1840s financed the first telegraph line between Baltimore and 
Washington. So the notion of having a technology policy is not a recent one. It 
goes back over 160 years. More recently, however, the Internet was also an inven-
tion of the US government; many of its characteristics that have made it so 
successful, particularly its highly decentralized nature, were the result of decisions 
made by the US government. (At the time that the Internet was created this was 
done for defense reasons, because they were worried that if they did not have a 
decentralized system it could be interrupted; so they developed a system that basi-
cally could not be controlled by anyone.) 
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These are just a few of the examples of the many successes of government-
funded R&D. Biotechnology, for instance, has become another major industry in 
the US, whose development rests on basic science coming out of government-
funded research. I have always found it somewhat incongruous how it is that Sili-
con Valley entrepreneurs whom I got to know when I was at Stanford would 
advocate so strongly the advantages of free markets and getting government out of 
the way when, in fact, their whole success depended on basing their work on ideas 
that have been originally produced by government-supported research. 
Inevitably, there have been some failures in government research projects. 
But I would argue that those failures are to be expected. Research is a highly risky 
endeavor. After all, if we knew the answer to our research before we began, it 
would not be research. The very nature of research has to be that we do not know 
the answer. Because we do not know the answer, sometimes we decide to invest in 
a research strategy that does not bear fruit. The fact that there are some failures 
should not be evidence against government-directed research strategies. In fact, I 
would argue quite the opposite. If there were not some failures, it would be evi-
dence that we were not taking sufficient risks. Of course, there have been 
problems. Many of them have been noted and discussed in the literature.  The 
government often has difficulty cutting off their projects and, in some cases, there 
are elements of corruption and political influence. 
But one should also recognize many of the same problems arise in the pri-
vate sector. The private sector mistakes in R&D in the US over the last five or ten 
years have become legion with billions and billions of dollars going down the 
drainmore than any government has ever wasted. (In many of these cases, they 
were also huge levels of what I would call corruption in the private sector, as a re-
sult of what might be called corporate governance problems, that have become 
endemic in banking, corporate, and auditing in the US and that led to massive mis-
allocations of resources.  
Overall, the social returns to R&D remain high, in both the public and pri-
vate sectors, and indeed, there has been a remarkable record of success in publicly 
supported technology development. (A study done at the Council of Economic 
Advisers while I was chair showed that indeed, government R&D had a far higher 
return than other forms of investment in either the public or private sector.)  I 
think that the record of success is sufficiently strong that it is worthwhile for gov-
ernments in developing countries to consider having a technology policy.  
 
IV.  IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
 
This leads us to the next question: Are there strategies that one can have for 
improving technology policies? Are there strategies that are more likely to lead to 
success? This was, in fact, a question that, when I was in the Clinton Administra-
tion, we explicitly posed to ourselves. We were convinced that there was a role for 
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government in technology policy. But recognizing that there have been some fail-
ures, the question was how do we make those failures less likely? And how do we 
make the successes more likely? There were six principal points that came up in 
our analysis.  
 
(i) There are some distinct advantages of broad-based policies and 
broad-based strategies as compared with narrowly focused strate-
gies. It is much better to have competition among a whole set of 
alternatives than to have a very narrow focus. For instance, if your ul-
timate concern is improving energy efficiency and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, you are to begin with that as your objec-
tive and look for all kinds of research proposals that might succeed in 
fulfilling that objective. In contrast, at one point in the US, there was 
a very narrowly focused research strategy that was directed at im-
proving the efficiency of coal-based technology. With that narrow 
focus, a correspondingly narrow set of special interest groups tried to 
design the research strategy, in ways that would enhance their profits, 
but not the ultimate national objectives. (Of course, it was partly be-
cause of these special interest groups that the focus was so narrow.). 
 
(ii) One ought to support a broad intellectual infrastructure. Here, I want 
to emphasize the key role of education, especially advanced educa-
tion and research institutions. This kind of intellectual infrastructure 
is something that developing countries have to work quite hard at to 
try to create. There was a time in which the World Bank emphasized, 
in its development strategy, a focus on primary education. There was 
an understandable reason for this, namely the desire to reduce pov-
erty. The World Bank recognized that advanced education (secondary 
and particularly tertiary education) is very expensive. The notion was 
that, you could do most to eliminate poverty by directing more re-
sources toward primary education. But the flip side of that is that it is 
very hard to close the knowledge gap (the technology gap that I 
spoke of earlier) without having people who are able to transfer tech-
nology knowledge from the more developed to the less developed 
countries. You do need to have a coterie of individuals who are able 
to absorb knowledge, translate that knowledge, and adapt that knowl-
edge to the situation in the country at hand. That is why today there is 
an increasing emphasis on higher education as part of a development 
strategy. The countries in East Asia recognized this very early; coun-
tries like Korea made that an explicit part of their development 
strategy. I think that was part of the key to their economic success. 
Having said that, one has to still be aware that, in many countries, 
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there are excess subsidies given to tertiary education. One can and 
should support advanced education in ways that limit the extent of 
subsidies, for instance, by requiring individuals to pay more for 
themselves by working or taking out student loans. Recognizing the 
importance of secondary and tertiary education does not necessarily 
fully resolve the issues of financing. 
 
(iii) It is important that there be close links between the research institu-
tions and the education institutions and industry. That is one of the 
areas in which the US has been most successful and accounts for a lot 
of the innovation that has occurred in the United States. Around ma-
jor US universities like Stanford or Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, a whole host of firms have developed whose job is to 
take the ideas being produced in the universities and translate them 
into products that have global market reach. The same thing can oc-
cur in developing countries as well. That, I would argue, is part of a 
development strategy that takes advantage of technology and global-
ization. 
 
(iv) It is important to have competitive selection of research projects and 
use peer review. This just repeats the repeats the general theme of the 
importance of competition in the economy; without competitive 
mechanisms, one is likely to have favoritism and the kinds of ineffi-
ciencies and distortions that one saw so often in the past. But the 
siccesses in the US, of the National Science Foundation, the National 
Health Institutes, and DARPA, the agency within the defense de-
partment that was responsible for many of the advances in technology 
including the Internet in the US, shows that one can develop scien-
tifically based independent peer review processes that work. 
 
(v) Government intervention should focus on areas where there are mar-
ket failures arising, for instance, out of finance or out of externalities. 
Government intervention is not based on the government being better 
at picking winners, but that it takes into account the full range of 
benefits that arise from research, and should focus explicitly on pro-
jects where it is hoped there are large externalities. 
 
(vi) Finally, one needs to think about joint ventures between the public 
and private sectors, and the partnerships can take on a variety of 
firms. Such partnerhips can be particularly valuable when the key is-
sue is a lack of finance. Joint ventures should require some equity 
commitments of those who are receiving funds from the government. 
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Such equity commitments can both act as a selection device at the 
same time that they help to provide good incentives for those receiv-
ing the government funds. 
 
V.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In this and the following two sections, I want to expand the discussion be-
yond technology policy to broader issues concerning how firm decisions get made 
and how the global economic system is managed. The issues are obviously closely 
linked: if managers of firms have objectives that are markedly different from that 
of the long interests of the firm, they may underinvest in technology, and be espe-
cially reluctant to make investments that only yield returns in the long run. There 
may, accordingly, be a larger role for government.   
The issues of corporate governance—how firms make decisions; ways that 
ensure those who turned over their resources to the firm, provided capital, or 
added their labor are treated appropriatelyare perpetual issues for all govern-
ments, for all countries. It is easy to define examples of bad corporate governance, 
and to recognize its consequences: If majority shareholders rip off minority share-
holders, tunneling out assets from the corporations, then obviously firms will find 
it difficult to raise capital from outside investors.  
The issue has become particularly sensitive in the United States. In fact, I 
feel particularly sensitive because the very parties that were criticizing East Asia 
for its corporate governance were resisting reforms that would have improved cor-
porate governance in the United States. Let me just tell two stories that you might 
find amusing. 
In 1993-1994, I fought a battle when I was at the Council of Economic Ad-
visers to change the accounting treatment of stock options, because they were 
extremely misleading. Treasury and Commerce gave absolutely the worst argu-
ment for not expensing. They said, if people knew what was going on, the value of 
the stocks will go down. They were only valued so high because people did not 
have the accurate information. But that was precisely why we needed to have bet-
ter information. They won and the country lost. Some of the same people later 
were to criticize Korea and Thailand so strongly for bad accounting and corporate 
governance. 
A second example focuses on the problems that have come to light in the 
US that involve enormous conflicts of interest in the banking sector. There are 
conflicts of interest for those saying “buy these stocks“ not because the stocks are 
good, but because they are working for investment banks that were raising capital 
for these companies. It is clear that there are a large number of different kinds of 
conflicts of interest. Actually, Treasury, at this time, was making those conflicts of 
interests worse, not better. We used to have separate retail banks and investment 
banks until we eliminated the separation. What was the result? Let me give you a 
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concrete example. When Enron was nearing bankruptcy, Chase Manhattan and the 
other banks continued to lend it money, not because they were making money nec-
essarily on the loans, but because they were trying to hide some of the investment 
shenanigans that they had done on the investment side (and perhaps they hoped 
that, were Enron to survive, they once again would be able to make huge profits 
from the lucrative investment deals with it.). They were not judging the loans on 
the basis of the loan itself, or if it was safe enough to pass muster. Corporate gov-
ernance problems exist in all countries. They arise from asymmetries of 
information, which are pervasive; those who have entrusted their money to the 
firm cannot monitor perfectly what the firm is doing with their money (and typi-
cally may not even know what the firm should do with the money). That is why 
you need government regulations to deal with them. 
As we review the East Asian crisis, we should not minimize the magnitude 
of the consequences, which are still being felt for instance in Indonesia. The dam-
age that arose from the way the crisis was managed, including the cutting off by 
the IMF of the food and fuel subsidies that led to the riots, will take years, if not 
decades, to undo. 
But growth has now at last returned. East Asian countries are doing much 
better than I thought they would, but they have not returned to the growth levels 
they had before the crisis. That is understandable because in most of the countries 
of the world, particularly East Asia, much of growth is financed by debt. Even in 
the US, new investment is financed to a very limited extent by new equity issues. 
The theory of asymmetric information helps to explain why new equity issues are 
a limited source of funding. If you have to rely mainly on debt finance, the magni-
tude of the debt finance that you can bear depends on the volatility of the market 
and how you respond to crises. When the IMF responded to the crisis in Korea, for 
instance, by forcing them to raise interest rates to, first, 25 percent and then all the 
way to 40 percent, it taught a very important lesson to the firms in Korea. Keep 
your debt down because, if you let your debt go high, you risk your survival. 
Companies like Samsung Electronics today have zero debt. They have taken this 
advice to the limit. 
The consequences for growth are obvious: if you are not willing to borrow, 
your rate of growth is inhibited. This too is a legacy of the mismanagement of the 
crisis and of the capital market liberalization that led to more volatility. Yes, these 
are part of the permanent legacy. I do not think you will expect to see growth to 
return to the levels that otherwise would have been achieved. (In this way, the 
IMF policies not only did not work in the short run, making the downturns worse; 
they continue to have adverse effects in the long run, slowing growth and, by lim-
iting the workings of the capital market, making resource allocations less 
efficient.) 
What about regional efforts to stave off crises? I am very strongly suppor-
tive of the Asian Monetary Fund for several reasons. Asian countries are more 
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dependent on each other. Therefore, they have greater incentives to help each 
other. I do not know if you remember the remark by the Secretary of the Treasury 
as the Thai crisis began, when he basically said, “This is Thailand’s problem. We 
are not going to do anything about it.” This caused an enormous amount of re-
sentment. The US came to the rescue of Mexico because Mexico was on its 
southern borders. Thailand was a long way off. Inevitably, there is going to be 
more sensitivity to one’s neighbors. That is why you want to have an Asian Mone-
tary Fund. 
There is another reason to create an Asian Monetary Fund. I certainly know 
that, in my discussions during the Asian crisis, Japan and the other Asian countries 
had a much better understanding of the economies of the countries in the region 
than the IMF and US Treasury did. If policy formulation had been left to Japan, to 
the countries in East Asia, you would have had a much shallower recession, a 
much better policy framework than what happened relying on the IMF. I do not, 
however, think that one should anticipate moving toward a single currency area. 
That is very problematic. But, between doing nothing and a currency area, there 
are lots of areas of cooperation that go further than you have already gone. 
 
VI.  TRADE LINKAGES AND FDI VIS-À-VIS CAPITAL MARKET 
AND BANKING SECTOR LIBERALIZATION 
 
 One does not need capital market liberalization to get foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). The strongest example of that is the People’s Republic of China, 
which is the largest recipient of FDIabout $50 billion in the last couple of 
yearsand which has not liberalized its capital markets. The two are separate. In 
fact, if the argument I gave before is correct, that capital market liberalization is 
associated with greater instability, capital market liberalization is bad for FDI be-
cause FDI wants a stable economic environment. There are advantages in having 
some foreign banks, particularly when a country is a recipient of FDI. Investors 
often feel more comfortable dealing with their own banks. The real question is 
how do you maintain at the same time strong domestic banks, and how do you, if 
you do have more foreign banks, maintain a flow of funds to small- and medium-
size domestic firms. One way that I have emphasized is that one ought to try to 
encourage banks to lend to small and medium-size enterprises and other under-
served communities. In the US, banks face what are called CRA (Community 
Reinvestment Act) requirements, which require all banks to put some amount like 
10 percent of their lending portfolio into underserved communities. One could 
imagine having a similar requirement of all banks, including foreign banks, to in-
vest 10 or 20 percent in underserved areas, including either small- and medium-
size enterprises, outlying islands, etc. That would redress some of the problems 
caused by the foreign banks investing excessively in a particular narrow clientele. 
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VII.  GLOBAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
 
There are some very severe problems with the global reserve system. Our 
current system has a number of problems. They affect all countries. Let me just 
illustrate two of them. 
One arises from the basic arithmetic of trade: the sum of the surpluses of the 
world have to equal to some deficits. If somebody imports more than they export, 
some other countries have to export more than they import. What does that mean? 
That means that, if there are some countries in the world that insist on having sur-
pluses, then that must mean that there are other countries that must have a deficit. 
Deficits become hot potatoes. In the way we run our systems today, if you have a 
large deficit, you get castigated. If one country has a large deficit, like Korea, and 
then it experiences a crisis and gets rid of the deficit, that deficit is bound to show 
up in the hands of somebody else. There is going to be crises going on from one 
country to another. That is part of the reason why we have crisis after crisis. 
The role of the dollar as a reserve currency creates not only this instability 
but also an enormous inequity. The only way that the system effectively works is 
that the US becomes the deficit of last resort. The US is able to absorb all the defi-
cits of all the other countries’ surpluses. Here we have the richest country in the 
world that is living well beyond its means. It is borrowing $1.5 billion a day, giv-
ing lectures to poor countries saying, “You will have to live within your means.” 
In the end, right now we are facing a situation in which the system is being ex-
posed to the possibility of an instability. Why do I say that? If the US is borrowing 
$1.5 billion a day, somebody has to be lending $1.5 billion a day. The only reason 
why they lend that money is that they have confidence in that country, in its eco-
nomic management, its political leadership. Well, there are reasons that one might 
be worried about the quality of at least the economic management. I will not say 
anything about the other dimensions of management. But even with the best of 
management, eventually, as indebtedness mounts, others may be reluctant to lend.  
On the economic side, one has to say America’s economic management is a 
remarkable failure, and one that is likely to have consequences not only for the 
US, but for the global economy. To give you a picture of the magnitude of what 
has happened, in May 2001, the US was projected on the nonsocial security ac-
count to have a $3 trillion surplus over the next ten years, a big number. Right 
now, we are projected to have a $2 trillion deficit. That is a $5 trillion turnaround 
in two years. But the administration is now making proposals to increase that $2 
trillion deficit to $4 trillion. It is the largest turnaround of any country any time, 
and, obviously, should cause angst to any investor. The developing world may 
suffer too as a result: the increased demand for funds will lead to higher real inter-
est rates, making the cost of capital facing developing countries all the higher. 
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VIII.  GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE TECHNOLOGY 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
I want to now return to the central theme of this talk, which is on technol-
ogy, globalization, and development. Well-designed globalization can promote 
technology and development. Trade links and FDI often bring access to markets 
and to technology. In fact, it is only with a certain degree of openness that one can 
get exposure to the ideas that are going to be necessary to close the knowledge 
gap. Joint ventures may be particularly effective because they take advantage of 
the local knowledge in facilitating the adaptation of technology. These are some 
of the ways in which globalization can act as an important vehicle through which 
technology is promoted, and, by promoting technology, so too can development 
be promoted. 
But I want to emphasize that poorly designed globalization can, in fact, in-
hibit development. For instance, capital market liberalization can lead to 
instability in the real economy, making real investment in both fiscal and human 
capital less attractive. Instability provides a bad environment in which to engage 
in real investments, including real investments in technology. At the time that the 
IMF was arguing vociferously for capital market liberalization, some suggested 
that it would lead to more investment, or even more stability. Those arguments 
made absolutely no sense. You cannot build factories on the basis of speculative 
capital that can come in and out of a country overnight. Even worse, speculative 
capital that comes in and out overnight leads to macroeconomic instability. The 
policies of capital market liberalization are actually growth inhibiting. Both theory 
and evidence show a clear link between capital market liberalization and instabil-
ity and the absence of a link between capital market liberalization and economic 
growth. 
I was pleased to see that, that quite recently, the IMF finally conceded the 
point. They finally came out with a report recognizing that short-term capital mar-
ket liberalization does not lead to more economic growth but does lead to more 
economic instability. It took them a long time to recognize this, and it was only af-
ter enormous amounts of pain were felt by many countries, including the countries 
in East Asia and Latin America. I say this as an aside but it is an important point. 
Here you had a major international economic institution trying to change the rules 
of the game, trying to change the policy framework that was adopted by develop-
ing countries, to change its very charter, even when there was absolutely no 
evidence at the time that it was good for the countries in question. It was good for 
Wall Street, however. They made money out of it. The question is: Was it good 
for the developing countries? Even then, the weight of opinion and evidence was 
that it was bad for growth and bad for stability. Now, six years later, the IMF fi-
nally came around to look at the evidence and they say, “you know, you were 
right.”  
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The same point is true on the excessive focus on inflation. We all know that 
hyperinflation, too high inflation, is bad. That is not the issue. The issue is, Does it 
do much good once you get inflation down to a moderate level to push it down 
lower; and, what is the moderate level, 10, 15, 20 percent? To put it another way: 
do countries in which the monetary authorities focus exclusively on inflation, 
grow faster, have lower unemployment, and have higher real wages than those 
countries that have a more balanced monetary policy? The answer is that there is 
no significant benefit from pushing inflation lower and lower beyond this critical 
threshold of 10, 15, 20 percent. Countries in which the monetary authorities focus 
exclusively on inflation do not grow faster, do not have lower unemployment, and 
do not even have a better trade-off between inflation and employment in their 
Philips curve. The evidence that those policies work is less than convincing. In 
fact, there are some arguments that, by focusing on inflation, on stability of prices, 
you may lead to greater instability in the real variables. By leading to greater in-
stability in the real variables, you again deter investment because what business 
cares about is the stability of the real environment. 
There is another aspect of globalization that I will just mention very briefly, 
which is one of the aspects of the recent WTO agreements, the opening up into 
new areas, including services. That, of course, made an enormous amount of sense 
because manufacturing is an increasingly small part of the economy and of trade. 
The US manufacturing is now down to about 14 percent of GDP. The things we 
used to talk about in our textbooks are really a very small part of the economy. 
The services sector is the one that is dominant. 
The particular aspect of this that I am concerned about is opening markets 
to financial services. This is an issue that Americans know very well because, un-
til 1995, banks were not allowed to operate throughout the United States. The US 
only had state banks. What was the reason for this restriction? The restriction was 
imposed because people in the Midwest and the West were worried that if you 
have banks from New York operating throughout the country, the banks in New 
York would take all the savings out of the Midwest and out of the West, and put 
them into New York. There was a worry that there would not be a flow of invest-
ment funds going into the Midwest or into the West and so that the growth in the 
US would be unbalanced. There was a real worry about national banks in the US, 
that having a banking system dominated by such banks would not result in a na-
tional development strategy. That was why, until 1995, national banking was not 
allowed in the United States. 
But, interestingly, just as we were getting around to allowing national bank-
ing in the US, we were insisting on global banks all over world. Thus the same 
banks that were just now being allowed in the Midwest would also be allowed 
everywhere else in the world. If they could go into Chicago, they should be able to 
go into every other country in the world. 
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Well, the worry in many developing countries is that the foreign banks will 
find it more comfortable, at least in the short term (though not necessarily in the 
long), to lend to large enterprises and particularly large multinational enterprises. 
The empirical evidence on this continues to be debated. Let me just mention an 
anecdotal experience. One of them was that, about three years ago, Argentina was 
facing a real problem of economic growth. It has had double-digit unemployment 
since 1995. The question was: What was hindering their economic growth? There 
was a widespread feeling that many of the small- and medium-size enterprises did 
not have adequate access to finance. The reason for this, put forward by many 
people including those in the government, was that the Argentinean banking sys-
tem had essentially been sold to foreigners and the foreign banks were not 
particularly interested in lending money to medium and small Argentinean firms. 
Just last year, Mexico sold one of its major banks to Citibank so that today 
there is only one remaining Mexican bank. Exactly the same concern about access 
by small- and medium-size enterprises to capital is now being heard extensively 
throughout Mexico.  
The final caveat relates to the unbalanced TRIPS agreement that I referred 
to earlier, which may inhibit access to new technology. There are other WTO re-
strictions that may impede the transfer and development of technology. Many of 
the policies, which were used by the US in its earlier stages of development, are 
now not going to be allowed in other developing countries under the new WTO 
arrangements. 
 
IX.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
To conclude, the countries that have been most successful have had a com-
prehensive technology policy, including education, research, and finance. Asia is, 
in fact, the most striking example of that success. But the US as well has had, over 
the years, a comprehensive technology policy, one involving education, research, 
and finance. 
It is important for me to digress here just for a second. One of the things 
that is quite striking about the US’s relationship with the IMF is the fact that the 
US is the only country that has veto power in the IMF, so that the IMF policies of-
ten reflect the perspectives of the United States. But what the US tells other 
countries to do is often markedly different from what it has itself done. 
Just to give you a couple of examples, the US has been telling other coun-
tries that monetary authorities should focus exclusively on inflation while the 
Federal Reserve Board focuses on inflation growth and unemployment. The US 
has told many other countries like Argentina, when they had an economic down-
turn and the downturn resulted in a deficit, that they should reduce that deficit. 
They should raise taxes. The IMF gave the same advice during the East Asia cri-
sis. Yet both political parties in the US, during its recession of 2001, agreed the 
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US ought to have a stimulus. Both Republicans and Democrats advocated doing 
what is taught in every graduate macro course in the world—cutting taxes and 
raising expenditures even if it results in a temporary deficit. But that is not what 
the IMF has advocated around the world. The US continues to support a public 
social security system that has been enormously successful, has low transaction 
costs—far lower than any private system—and has virtually eliminated poverty 
among the aged, providing insurance against instability in stock markets, and in-
surance against inflation. Yet the IMF has been pushing countries all over the 
world to privatize their social security system. 
The IMF has voiced opposition to countries having a technology policy or 
“industrial policy.” The IMF has suggested that it is inappropriate for govern-
ments to do so, yet the US has, for 160 years, had a very strong industrial policy 
that has been extremely successful and accounts for a great deal of the US’s eco-
nomic success.  
Because of globalization, challenges and opportunities today are greater 
than ever before. There are new opportunities to seize. Globalization has made the 
knowledge of the world much more easily available than ever before. And the 
Internet too has made knowledge much more available than it ever was before. 
The question is: Will the design of the international regime and the design of the 
international economic institutions and the policies that they have pursued help 
developing countries seize these new opportunities to reduce the disparities in 
knowledge, the gap between the developed or less developed countries? Or will 
the design of the international regime make it all the more difficult for the gap to 
be overcome? I fear that, in many ways, what has happened in the last few years 
has been making it more difficult, not easier, for the developing countries to over-
come these knowledge barriers. But I remain hopeful. That was one of the reasons 
I wrote in my book, Globalization and its Discontents. I believe that globalization 
can be a very powerful force for developing countries, enabling the technology 
gap and the knowledge gap that separates the developed from the less developed 
countries to be overcome. But if that promise is to be achieved, I do think that 
there will have to be fundamental reforms in the institutions and in the policies 
governing globalization in the world today. 
